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Abstract 
 This paper reviews the state of the art in cyber security risk assessment of 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. We select and in-detail 
examine twenty-four risk assessment methods developed for or applied in the context of a 
SCADA system. We describe the essence of the methods and then analyse them in terms 
of aim; application domain; the stages of risk management addressed; key risk 
management concepts covered; impact measurement; sources of probabilistic data; 
evaluation and tool support. Based on the analysis, we suggest an intuitive scheme for the 
categorisation of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. We also 
outline five research challenges facing the domain and point out the approaches that 
might be taken. 
Keywords: SCADA, cyber security, risk assessment, risk analysis 
1. Introduction 
 A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is a type of 
Industrial Control System (ICS). An ICS controls processes in the industrial sector and in 
the sectors which form a Critical National Infrastructure 
(CNI) Error! Reference source not found.. The list of sectors forming CNI varies from 
country to country. In the UK, CNI is defined as “Those infrastructure assets (physical 
or electronic) that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity of the essential 
services upon which the UK relies, the loss or compromise of which would lead to severe 
economic or social consequences or to loss of life” and is formed by nine sectors: energy, 
food, water, transportation, communications, emergency services, health care, financial 
services and government Error! Reference source not found.. 
 SCADA systems stand out among other ICSs as systems that (1) monitor and 
control assets distributed over large geographical areas, and (2) use specific control 
equipment such as a Master Terminal Unit (MTU) and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), 
which we further discuss in Section 2. Initially, SCADA systems were used in power 
transmission, gas pipeline and water distribution control systems. Nowadays, SCADA 
systems are widely used in steel making, chemistry, telecommunications, experimental 
and manufacturing facilities [2, 4, 6]. 
 The smooth and reliable operation of SCADA systems is vital for such sectors of 
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CNI as energy, water and transportation where both data acquisition and control are 
critically important. A widespread, long-lasting outage of SCADA and, consequently, 
CNI may cause serious disturbance to a state and society [6, 11]. The consequences of a 
malfunction of a SCADA system may be detrimental and may range from financial loss 
due to an equipment and environmental damage to the loss of human 
life Error! Reference source not found.. 
 Security in general and cyber security specifically were not the major concerns of 
early standalone SCADA systems Error! Reference source not found.. Security was 
primarily achieved by controlling physical access to system components which were 
unique and used proprietary communication protocols. For years, security in SCADA 
systems was present only as an implication of safety. Over the last decade, however, the 
situation has changed, and a number of standards and directives dealing with the cyber 
security of SCADA systems have emerged. 
 In 2004, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the 
document titled System Protection Profile - Industrial Control Systems which covers the 
risks and objective of SCADA systems Error! Reference source not found.. In 2005, the 
National Infrastructure Security Coordination Center (NISCC), a predecessor of the 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) in the UK, published a good 
practice guide for firewall deployment in SCADA 
networks Error! Reference source not found.. In 2007, the US President’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board and the Department of Energy outlined the steps an 
organisation must undertake to improve the security of its SCADA networks in the 
booklet 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA 
Networks Error! Reference source not found.. In 2008, the Centre for Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI) produced a Good Practice Guide for Process Control and 
SCADA Security Error! Reference source not found. encapsulating best security 
practices. In 2008, NIST released a comprehensive guidance on a wide range of security 
issues, and technical, operational and management security controls. The guide was 
updated in 2011 Error! Reference source not found.. In 2013, the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) released the recommendations 
for Europe on SCADA patching Error! Reference source not found.. Currently, the 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) actively works on the 
development of a wide range of standards covering many aspects of CNI cyber 
security Error! Reference source not found.. More extensive overviews of 
SCADA-related security standards and initiatives are provided in [2, 12]. 
 Modern day SCADA systems are highly sophisticated, complex and based on 
advanced technology systems. The escalating sophistication and modernisation as well as 
real-time continuous operation and distributed, multi-component architecture underpin 
the growth of cyber threats to SCADA systems. SCADA systems are exposed to a wide 
range of cyber threats also because of the standardisation of communication protocols 
and hardware components, growing interconnectivity and legacy. (All these aspects we 
discuss in greater detail in Section 2.) 
 Over the last several decades we already saw a range of cyber attacks on CNI and 
SCADA. In 1982, the first recorded cyber attack on CNI took place at the Trans-Siberian 
pipeline and resulted in an explosion visible from 
space Error! Reference source not found.. Over the last decade there was a number of 
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cyber attacks on SCADA systems and ICS. In 2003, a slammer worm penetrated a 
network at the Davies-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio [8, 11] and a computer virus named 
Sobig shut down train signalling systems in Florida Error! Reference source not found.. 
In 2006, a hacker penetrated the operation system of a water treatment facility in 
Harrisburg, USA [8, 11] and the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama was manually 
shut due to the overload of network traffic Error! Reference source not found.. In 2007, 
a dismissed employee installed unauthorised software on the SCADA system of the 
Tehama Colusa Canal Authority Error! Reference source not found.. In 2010, the 
Stuxnet computer worm struck the Iranian nuclear facility causing the failure of almost 
one-fifth of all centrifuges Error! Reference source not found.. Stuxnet was a 
game-changer, it attracted the world’s attention to cyber threats to CNI by drawing a 
vivid and horrifying picture of the consequences of a cyber attack on CNI. In 2011, five 
global energy and oil firms were targeted by a combination of attacks including social 
engineering, trojans and Windows-based exploits Error! Reference source not found.. In 
2012, a malware named Flame was discovered to have been operating in many sites in 
the Middle East and North Africa for at least two 
years Error! Reference source not found.. A larger number of cyber attacks on CNI is 
listed and analysed in [10, 12]. 
 The analysis in Error! Reference source not found. indicates that the number of 
cyber attacks on CNI increases over time. The number of SCADA-related incidents also 
steadily grows. In 2010, the Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) had 161 
incidents listed with about 10 new incidents being added each 
quarter Error! Reference source not found.. In 2013, the RISI database contained already 
240 incidents recorded between 2001 and the end of 
2012 Error! Reference source not found.. Additionally, an extensive study of the current 
cyber security state of SCADA systems based on a set of interviews with a large number 
of experts confirmed that cyber threats in SCADA systems are escalating, they are “real 
and expanding” Error! Reference source not found.. 
 All the above stipulates the strong need for the effective management of cyber 
security risks in SCADA systems. Risk assessment is an important part of the best 
practice risk management in ICS and SCADA systems [13, 15]. Risk assessment answers 
the following three questions Error! Reference source not found.: 
 • What can go wrong? 
 • What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? 
 • What are the consequences? 
Risk management builds upon the risk assessment in order to answer the other three 
questions Error! Reference source not found.: 
 • What can be done and what options are available? 
 • What are the associated trade-offs in terms of all costs, benefits, and risks? 
 • What are the impacts of current management decisions on future options? 
 A range of standards and normative documents attending to risk management and 
risk assessment has been devised over the years for IT systems. ISO 31000:2009 
Error! Reference source not found. outlines generic, non-industry-specific guidelines on 
risk management. NIST SP 800-30 contains a guide on risk management for IT 
systems Error! Reference source not found.. NIST 
800-37 Error! Reference source not found. provides a risk management framework for 
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federal information systems. ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Error! Reference source not found. is 
a standard for information security risk management. 
 A range of general IT risk assessment methodologies is used in industry: 
Operationally Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) Error! Reference source not found., Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency Risk Analysis and Management Method 
(CRAMM) Error! Reference source not found., Consultative, Objective and 
Bi-functional Risk Analysis (COBRA) Error! Reference source not found. and 
CORAS [49, 50], a model-based risk assessment methodology for security-critical 
systems. Also there is a broad range of academic proposals such as for example 
Information Security Risk Analysis Method 
(ISRAM) Error! Reference source not found., COst estimation, Benchmarking, and Risk 
Assessment (COBRA) Error! Reference source not found., SPRINT, a simplified 
practical risk analysis methodology Error! Reference source not found., and the 
Business Process: Information Risk Management (BPIRM) 
methodology Error! Reference source not found. to name just a few. 
 While a large number of IT risk assessment methodologies exists, the specifics of 
SCADA systems as opposed to IT systems, which are discussed in Section 2, often 
prevent the straight forward application of risk assessment methods designed for 
corporate IT systems to SCADA systems. An IT risk assessment method must be 
adjusted to fit the context of SCADA systems. 
 In the general context, risk is described as 
follows Error! Reference source not found.: 
    = { , , }, = 1, 2, ...,
i i i
R s p x i N     (1) 
where 
 R - risk; 
 {} - must be interpreted as a “set of”; 
 s - a scenario (undesirable event) description; 
 p - the probability of a scenario; 
 x - the measure of consequences or damage caused by a scenario; and 
 N - the number of possible scenarios that may cause damage to a system. 
 In the context of a SCADA system, risk “is a function of the likelihood of a given 
threat source exploiting a potential vulnerability and the resulting impact of a successful 
exploitation of the vulnerability” [1, Sec. 6.1.3]. When applied to quantifying cyber 
security risks in SCADA systems the formula for calculating risk is accepted as 
follows Error! Reference source not found.: 
     = ,
tv
R t v x      (2) 
where 
 t - threat; 
 v - vulnerability; and 
 tv
x  - the consequences of the threat successfully exploiting the vulnerability. 
 Risk assessment in SCADA systems shall help to prioritise (1) the components of 
a system in terms of their importance to the successful operation of the system or in terms 
of their level of vulnerability to an attack, and (2) threats in terms of the danger they pose 
and their likelihood. Risk assessment shall assist the managers and engineers of SCADA 
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systems with the development of adequate security policies, with the design of secure 
system and with the rational allocation of often scares 
resources Error! Reference source not found.. It shall also facilitate the communication 
between security, business and SCADA experts. 
 In 2004, it was stated that “[t]here is an urgent need for a systemic risk-based 
methodology that would add protection to SCADA systems, given their central role in 
controlling and operating critical interdependent infrastructure systems” [23, p.18]. 
During the past ten years a number of risk assessment methodologies for SCADA 
systems were proposed. Driven by the importance of managing and assessing cyber 
security risks in SCADA systems, the ultimate aim of the paper at hand is a 
comprehensive, structured and detailed review of existing cyber security risk assessment 
methods specifically tailored for SCADA systems. 
 Several relevant literature reviews exist. Reviews covering SCADA security and 
cyber security issues are presented in [2, 6, 12, 13], but these reviews do not concentrate 
on risk assessment methods. In Error! Reference source not found., twenty-one risk 
assessment methodologies for CNI proposed by various commercial and organisations 
are surveyed; however, Error! Reference source not found. does not concentrate on 
SCADA systems. In Error! Reference source not found., only a brief description of 
several risk assessment methodologies for the oil and gas sector is outlined. An extensive 
overview of risk assessment methodologies is contained 
in Error! Reference source not found., but only two methods are examined in detail. This 
review paper updates and significantly extends the overview of risk assessment methods 
in Error! Reference source not found., which was published in 2007. Our review devotes 
equal attention to every method examined. To the best our knowledge, this paper 
provides the most comprehensive and detailed overview of cyber security risk assessment 
methods applied in the context of SCADA systems. 
 Another aim of the paper is to examine the advantages and drawbacks of the 
existing cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. This analysis forms 
a solid foundation upon which new risk assessment methods for SCADA systems might 
draw and the existing ones might be improved. 
 Risk assessment methods in general and in the context of SCADA systems 
specifically are hard to categorise as we conclude based on our analysis and in agreement 
with [6, 7]. A categorisation scheme must be multilateral and must focus attention on the 
different aspects of methods. The development of a comprehensive, yet intuitive 
categorisation scheme remains an open research question. A categorisation scheme may 
assist with (1) the search and review of relevant methods, (2) the identification of similar 
or duplicating methods, and (3) the elaboration of the common characteristics of the 
methods of the same category. The latter might enable a sound analysis of methods 
within a category. 
 Based on the comprehensive review, in this paper we propose an intuitive 
categorisation of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. On one 
lateral, we split the methods examined into guidelines, activity-specific methods and 
elaborated guidelines. On another lateral, we categorise methods into model-based and 
formula based. 
 The detailed description of examined methods, their thorough analysis and 
intuitive classification scheme presented in this paper aim to provide guidance for and 
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assist practitioners with the choice of an appropriate risk assessment method. The review 
examines the application domain of the methods, their aims, key concepts and stages of 
risk management addressed. We also discuss the sources of probabilistic data used by the 
methods, how the impact is measured, how the methods are evaluated and whether tool 
support is provided. The drawbacks of widely-used probabilistic risk assessment methods 
are also revealed to the reader. 
 As the outcome of our review, we describe current research challenges in cyber 
security risk assessment in SCADA systems and point out to possible approaches that can 
help future work in this area. Research communities and practitioners dealing with risk 
management in SCADA systems may benefit from this discussion. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2, in order to arm 
the reader before exposing him/her to the review we provide some background discussion 
on what SCADA systems are and on security challenges facing them. Then, in Sections 3 
we describe the review methodology. Section 4 provides the reader with the brief 
descriptions of all methods examined. We found it necessary to present these descriptions 
prior to the analysis as the knowledge of separate methods leads to the better appreciation 
of the review results. Section 5, contains the summary analysis of the methods examined 
and key findings that stem from it. Finally, Section 6 outlines research challenges facing 
the domain of cyber security risk assessment in SCADA systems in future. We draw 
some concluding remarks in Section 7. 
2. SCADA Systems and Cyber Security Challenges 
 A SCADA system consists of hardware and software components, and of a 
connecting network(s). Figure 1 shows a generic hardware architecture of a SCADA 
system. An architecture is formed by one or more control centres and a number of field 
devices such as an RTU, Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) and Programmable Logic 
Controller (PLC) connected by a communication infrastructure. An RTU receives data 
from field devices, converts it to digital data and sends it to the control centre as well as 
receives digital commands from the centre and handles alarms. A PLC is a digital 
computer that monitors sensors and takes decisions based upon a user created program to 
control valves, solenoids and other actuators. A control centre includes an MTU, which 
issues commands to and gathers data from RTUs, it also stores and processes data in 
order to display information to human operators to support decision making. Human 
operators monitor and control the system from a control center via Human-Machine 
Interface (HMI) displays. 
 Communication on a SCADA network is paramount. Messages are exchanged (1) 
between master devices, which control operation of other devices (e.g. PLCs) and slave 
devices (e.g. sensors, actuators, relays), which send messages to master devices and 
perform actions at their command, and (2) between field devices using a peer-to-peer 
communication model Error! Reference source not found.. The following 
communication protocols are used in SCADA systems: Ethernet/IP, DeviceNet, 
ControlNet, PROFIBUS, MODBUS TCP/IP, DNP3 and Foundation Fieldbus [2, 5]. As 
they cover large geographical areas, SCADA systems typically use Wide Area Networks 
(WAN). The communication infrastructure may be satellite, radio, power line based and 
any combination of the above. 
 The software in SCADA systems is multi-tasking, uses real-time database(s) and 
typically provides the following functionality: the display of synoptic diagrams and text 
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as well as a possibility to view them on multiple screens, general editing (e.g. re-sizing 
and scrolling), trend analysis, alarm handling, logging, archiving, report generation and 
the automatic triggering of control actions Error! Reference source not found.. 
 Following advances in Information and Communication Technology (ICT), over 
the last two decades the architecture of a SCADA system has become more open with a 
large number of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software relying upon 
standardised communication protocols being used. The reasons for these changes in a 
SCADA architecture are, among others, financial. The use of off-the-shelf components 
and open communication protocols leads to a significant cost reduction. The number of 
proprietary design and implementation activities to be carried out by an end-user 
decreases. Technical support and maintenance are provided by a vendor eliminating the 
need for an in-house support team. 
 The use of standardised communication protocols enables the integration of a 
SCADA system with a corporate IT system and its connection to the Internet. The 
increased interconnectivity of SCADA systems simplifies their maintenance and control: 
“You are a manager at a municipal utility. A few years ago, when the beeper signaled an 
alarm well past midnight, you had to drape a raincoat over your pajamas, jump into your 
car and race to the plant. Once there, you ran down to the basement and flipped some 
switches. Nowadays, you reach for your tablet or smart phone and tap some icons 
without leaving your warm and cozy bed” Error! Reference source not found.. 
 SCADA systems must adjust to interconnectivity as did corporate IT systems at 
the early days of the Internet. However, SCADA are different from business information 
systems in many ways. SCADA systems are time critical and geographically distributed, 
they support complex interactions between physical and logical infrastructures while 
operating continuously, the effect of malfunction is more tangible while access to the 
various components of a system is more complicated, and the life time of system 
components is usually 3 to 4 times longer. NIST SP 800-82 [1, Sec. 
3.1], Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found.
 and Error! Reference source not found. discuss the differences between IT systems and 
ICS in greater detail. 
 The specifics of SCADA systems lead to the fact that not all security 
countermeasures exploited in IT systems are applicable to SCADA systems. In fact, some 
countermeasures may damage a SCADA system more than secure it. On the one hand, 
security countermeasures such as access control, VPN and firewall, which have already 
demonstrated their efficiency in the IT security domain, are also successfully adopted by 
SCADA systems Error! Reference source not found.. On the other hand, 
countermeasures such as authentication and cryptography must be used with an extreme 
caution because they may have a disruptive effect on the operation of a SCADA system 
where every action is time critical. In Error! Reference source not found., it is is 
discussed how traditional IT security countermeasures may be exploited in SCADA 
systems avoiding negative impact on system safety and efficiency. 
 For over forty years confidentiality, integrity and availability - also referred to as 
the CIA-triad - have been defining the set and priorities of security goals for corporate 
information systems. In ICS and SCADA systems, the priorities among the goals are 
different. Among the triad, integrity and availability are highly paramount, while 
confidentiality is secondary for SCADA systems [13, 18]. In reality, security goals, in 
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what ever order they appear, are often preceded in SCADA systems by safety, reliability, 
robustness and maintainability (which are the supreme goal of critical systems) leaving 
little or no resources for security goals. In Error! Reference source not found., the 
authors discuss a need for an update of such well established international security 
standards as NIST SP 800-53 and ISO 27001 in order to address the specifics of ISC is 
stated. A new standards, according to Error! Reference source not found. shall be bring 
together the CIA-traid and safety requirement critical in the context of an ICS. 
 Cyber security issues in SCADA systems are further exacerbated by the legacy 
problem. Existing SCADA systems, due to their continuous operation, are not updated or 
re-designed in some cases for decades. The nature of SCADA systems requires them to 
be operational 24 hours 7 days a week. This makes the regular patching and upgrading of 
both a SCADA software and a hosting operating system difficult, if not impossible [12, 
13]. The patching of a SCADA system is complicated by the facts that the system is 
time-critical, there is no test environment and patching may introduce new unknown 
vulnerabilities or ultimately break the system. Legacy SCADA system may end up 
relying on operating systems and software that are no longer supported by 
vendors Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The human factor plays a momentous role in cyber security of SCADA systems. 
Human supervision, and complicated software architecture and development process are 
the characteristics of SCADA systems which exacerbate the role of the human 
factor Error! Reference source not found.. An eternal vigilance regarding human factor 
helps with the prevention of human errors which may result in unintended attacks, and 
with the prevention of intended internal and external social engineering attacks. Attacks 
by internal agents, i.e. employees of an organisation, are more often than attacks by 
external ones Error! Reference source not found.. The increased sophistication of 
SCADA systems calls for highly knowledgeable and well-trained personnel. Despite the 
need, proper training for people working with SCADA systems often comes short in 
practice Error! Reference source not found.. The study of the role of the human factor in 
cyber security of SCADA systems started to gain momentum over the last decade [23, 6]. 
3. Review Methodology 
 The scope of the literature review conducted was as follows. The original set of 
papers was formed from the searchers run on IEEE Xplore, ACM, SCOPUS and Web of 
Science as recommended in Error! Reference source not found.. IEEE Xplore and ACM 
provide a good coverage of relevant journals and conferences. SCOPUS and Web of 
Science are two general indexing systems. The search string was constructed from the 
keywords “SCADA” and “risk assessment”. The search covered the period of ten years 
between 2004 and 2014. The search was performed in November 2014 and returned for 
ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, SCOPUS and Web of Science (Core Collection) 36, 
14, 105 and 14 papers respectively. The resulting set of papers undergone manual 
reduplication. Next, papers were selected for review manually based on the examination 
of the title, abstract and full text where it was readily available or where the information 
provided in the abstract was not sufficient. We also ensured that all papers relevant to the 
subject of this review mentioned in the review papers covering security and risk in 
SCADA, namely [2, 6, 12, 13], are included in our analysis. 
 As a general rule, we included in the review the papers which suggested a new 
method covering at least one of the stages of a risk assessment process and where a 
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method was specifically developed for or applied to a SCADA system. The papers which 
are dedicated to security requirements derivation, but are not written in the context of risk 
assessment (e.g Error! Reference source not found.) as well as the papers addressing 
vulnerability analysis from the technical rather than the risk management perspective (e.g. 
[41, 42]) were not included in our review. We focused only on research publications 
dealing primarily with cyber security or information security, while the papers covering 
risk assessment from the safety or reliability perspectives only 
(e.g. Error! Reference source not found.) were excluded out of the review. This was 
done in order to keep the scope of our analysis in such a breadth where it is possible to 
examine each method in detail rather than superficially. Furthermore, such topics as 
safety and reliability in the context of SCADA are very broad and complex, and are 
typically studied by different research communities. 
 Arguably, many IT risk assessment methodologies with some adjustments may be 
applied to SCADA systems with various degree of success. However, to what degree IT 
methods are fit for SCADA systems and what adjustments they need remain open 
research questions. Therefore, in this paper, we examined only those risk assessment 
methods which were developed for or already applied to SCADA systems. We avoided 
conjecturing about the applicability of corporate IT risk assessment methods to SCADA 
systems. 
 Finally, 24 papers, each presenting a risk assessment method for a SCADA 
system, were selected for the analysis in this review paper. The methods were examined 
according to the following criteria: 
 1. Aim; 
 2. Application domain; 
 3. Stages of risk management addressed; 
 4. Key concepts of risk management covered; 
 5. Impact measurement; 
 6. Sources of data for deriving probabilities; 
 7. Evaluation method; and 
 8. Tool Support. 
 In the following section, the essence of each risk assessment method selected for 
analysis is epitomised. We describe the methods in a chronological order. This is 
followed by the discussion and summary analysis of the methods in Section 5. 
 Before we proceed with the description and analysis of the methods, the 
limitations of the review process must be noted. First, the analysis was done based only 
on our interpretation of the papers. We did not contact the authors of the methods to 
verify the correctness of our understanding. Second, as with any literature review, it was 
not possible to exclude the factor of subjectivity while selecting and analysing methods. 
Facing up this issue, we made the selection and analysis process transparent by 
thoroughly documenting it. Third, we did not specifically trace for each method analysed 
whether there is a follow up on the method from one of the authors unless a follow up 
paper appeared among the papers selected for analysis or the existence of a follow up 
paper was mentioned in the paper examined. Finally, we cannot completely rule out the 
existence of other relevant unobserved risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. 
Some proposals may have not found their place in the review due to various reasons: a 
terminology used by authors which did not bring a paper in to the radar of our analysis, a 
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paper not being listed on the databases examined, the subjectivity factor, and time and 
resource restrictions on the report production. Nevertheless, the literature search method 
adopted helped to ensure an acceptable level of the completeness of our literature review. 
Hence, we believe that the set of papers analysed is representative and the results of the 
analysis may be generalised for the domain. 
4. Description of Risk Assessment Methods for SCADA 
4.1. Risk Assessment in SCADA for Railways, 
2004 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A risk assessment framework which utilises the Hierarchical Holographic 
Modelling (HHM) and is designed for GPS-based railway SCADA systems is described 
in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 HHM is the methodology for “capturing and representing the essence of the 
inherent diverse characteristics and attributes of a 
system” Error! Reference source not found.. HMM was used for modelling complex 
defence and civilian systems. It aids in assessing risks in sub-systems and their effect on 
the system as a whole, which makes HHM useful in the context of 
SCADA Error! Reference source not found.. 
 Three sub-models are distinguished in the hierarchical holographic model of a 
SCADA system Error! Reference source not found.: (1) hardware and software, (2) 
human supervisory and (3) environment. Each of these sub-models is decomposed into 
elements and each element is decomposed into subtopics. 
 The framework suggests to map the Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology (CobiT) onto the holographic model in order to facilitate risk 
identification. 
4.2. Attack Trees for Assessing Vulnerabilities in SCADA, 
2004 Error! Reference source not found. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., attack trees are used to assess 
vulnerabilities in SCADA systems based on MODBUS and MODBUS/TCP 
communication protocols. An attack tree provides a structured view of events leading to 
an attack and, ultimately, helps with the identification of appropriate security 
countermeasures. 
 Risk, according to Error! Reference source not found., depends on: (1) system 
architecture and conditions; (2) countermeasures in place; (3) attack difficulty; (4) 
detection probability; and (5) attack cost. The purpose of the assessment 
in Error! Reference source not found. is to calculate the characteristics of the topmost 
attack event and to identify possible ways to achieve the final goal of the attack. In order 
to achieve this, first, a team of industry experts identifies possible goals of an attacker 
and designs an attack tree with goals depicted as the nodes of the tree. Then, each leave 
of an attack tree is assigned a level of technical difficulty on the scale 
“Trivial-Moderate-Difficult-Unlikely”. Based on two functions - AND as the maximum 
of the children nodes values and OR as the minimum of the children nodes values - the 
difficulty of each node that has children nodes is calculated. The difficulty rating may 
vary over time. 
 Each goal is also characterised by the severity of impact it may cause and by the 
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probability of detecting malicious activity associated with this goal. Both indicators are 
also defined on relative scales. 
 The paper presents a sample attack tree for a MODBUS-based SCADA system 
(Figure 2). The trees in Error! Reference source not found. were designed by the team of 
industry experts and the feasibility of the attacks was tested in a laboratory settings. 
4.3. Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for SCADA Security, 
2005 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A cyber vulnerability assessment methodology for SCADA systems 
in Error! Reference source not found. is based upon the experience of assessing the 
security of multiple SCADA systems conducted as a part of the national SCADA Test 
Bed program sponsored by the Department of Energy - Office of Electricity and Energy 
Assurance, US and the Idaho National Laboratory SCADA Test Bed program. 
 The methodology described in Error! Reference source not found. consists of 
five steps: 
 1. Assessment plan development: a plan outlines budget, schedule, goals, 
resources and the engagement of experts required, and deliverables expected from an 
assessment. 
 2. Testing environment configuration: the testing environment must be safe 
and non-production configuration. 
 3. Vulnerability assessment: the vulnerability assessment is performed via a 
penetration test conducted from an external to the tested system machine. A range of 
open source and commercial tools for assessing system vulnerability is listed. 
 4. Reporting: the methodology of assessment and testing along with the 
results must be thoroughly documented. 
 5. Metrics and scoring: the security of SCADA system must be measured 
quantitatively so that it may be benchmarked against other systems. 
4.4. Quantitative Cyber Risk Reduction Estimation Methodology, 
2006 Error! Reference source not found. 
 McQueen et al. Error! Reference source not found. suggest a methodology for 
the quantitative estimation of cyber risk reduction for a SCADA system in which an 
enhancement of cyber security has been performed. For risk reduction estimation a 
directed graph of a cyber attack is developed for both a baseline and improved systems, 
and the difference in time-to-compromise each system is measured and analysed. 
 The methodology consists of ten steps: 
 1. Establish system configuration; 
 2. Identify the applicable portions of the quantitative risk model; 
 3. Identify and prioritise the security requirements of the primary target(s); 
 4. Identify system vulnerabilities; 
 5. Categorise vulnerabilities on each device by the type of compromise; 
 6. Estimate time-to-compromise for each device; 
 7. Generate compromise graph(s) and attack paths; 
 8. Estimate dominant attack path(s); 
 9. Perform steps 3-8 for both baseline and enhanced system; and 
 10. Compare results of both version of the system and estimate risk reduction. 
 McQueen et al. Error! Reference source not found. introduce a formula for 
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calculating the probability of an occurrence of an undesired event. This probability is the 
product of the following conditional probabilities: the probability of the system being on 
an attacker’s target list, the probability of being attacked given that the system is targeted, 
the probability of a perimeter breach given that the system is attacked, the probability of a 
successful attack given that there is a perimeter breach and the probability of damage 
given the system is successfully attacked. Since the estimation of all probabilities 
involved is not feasible, risk reduction is measured as the change of the probabilities of 
perimeter breach and successful attack rather than an absolute value of risk. 
 Security requirements for SCADA are identified so that integrity and availability 
have the highest priority, while confidentiality is secondary. The vulnerabilities of a 
system are identified using existing vulnerability identification libraries. Each 
vulnerability is classified as reconnaissance, breach, penetrate, escalation or damage. 
Time-to-compromise a device is calculated. It depends on the known vulnerabilities of 
the target system and the skills of an attacker. A circumstantial discussion of the methods 
for estimating time-to-compromise could be found 
in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 A compromise graph, where each node indicates a potential attack state, is 
developed for the baseline and enhanced SCADA systems, and the dominant paths of 
attack are chosen as the paths which require minimum time-to-compromise the target 
system. Finally, time required to compromise the baseline and enhanced system is 
compared. Time-to-compromise here is used as the main indicator of system security and 
risk. 
 For the evaluation purposes, the proposed methodology is applied to a small-size 
SCADA system for measuring the effectiveness of security countermeasures. 
4.5. Vulnerability Assessment of Cyber Security in Power Industry, 
2006 Error! Reference source not found. 
 Two formulas for the probabilistic assessment and integrated risk assessment of 
cyber security vulnerability in SCADA systems, Energy Management Systems and 
Management Information Systems are proposed in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The vulnerability index of the cyber security of a system is calculated as follows: 
   = ( ) ( / ) ( )

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where 
 P(Ej) is the probability of the occurrence of event Ej; 
 
( / )
j j
P EL E  is the probability of power system accident ELj resulting from cyber 
security event Ej; and 
 Lj - the loss caused by accident ELj. 
 It is not clear from the paper, how the probability of a security event is estimated, 
it is only mentioned that the probability is Poisson distributed. 
4.6. Scenario-based Approach to Risk Analysis in Support of Cyber 
Security, 2006 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A scenario-based approach to cyber risk assessment used by the Control Systems 
Security Center (CSSC) for the National Cyber Security Division of the Department of 
Homeland Security is described in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The scenario and risk assessment process consists of ten activities: 1) identify key 
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infrastructure; 2) identify representative mid-level processes; 3) determine consequences 
levels; 4) develop process flow diagrams with key components, structures and systems; 5) 
review underlying safety analysis and operating history; 6) review threat and 
vulnerability data; 7) develop likely attack pathways and key human-system responses; 8) 
compute probabilities and assess quantifiable resultant damage state; and 10) document 
findings, assess limitations and produce uncertainty characterisation. 
 The system under examination was modelled by experts familiar with industrial 
process and security requirements. Vulnerabilities and threats as well as expected 
human-system response were reviewed by operation experts, while probabilities and 
possible ways of attacks were defined by cyber experts. The opinion of experts were 
captured using the Delphi technique. As a part of the scenario-based method attack 
variations, skills required by an attacker and potential system effects were elaborated for 
a particular cyber attach scenario on a nuclear plant. 
4.7. Two Indices Method for Quantitative Assessment of the Vulnerability 
of Critical Information Systems, 2008 Error! Reference source not found. 
 Another method for the qualitative assessment of the vulnerability (security level) 
of a SCADA system is suggested in Error! Reference source not found.. The method 
helps system managers to make more informed decisions about security countermeasures 
to be implemented. 
 The method is based on a vulnerability tree augmented with two indices, namely 
threat-impact index and cyber-vulnerability index. The threat-impact index reflects a 
financial effect of a cyber threat: a higher index indicates a higher impact. The 
cyber-vulnerability index reflects the vulnerability of a system with regard to cyber 
attacks. A more vulnerable system has a higher index. Both indices are measured on the 
scale from 0 to 100. 
 The method requires five steps to be undertaken: 
 1. Development of the base-level and expanded vulnerability trees for an 
original system; 
 2. Population of an effect analysis table and calculation of threat-impact 
index values; 
 3. Augmentation of the tree with threat-impact index values; 
 4. Calculation of cyber-vulnerability index values; 
 5. Augmentation of the tree with cyber-vulnerability index values; and 
 6. Reproduction of steps 2 to 5 for a security-enhanced system and the 
comparison of results. 
 The vulnerability tree presented in Error! Reference source not found. was 
developed based on the analysis of attacks launched in the past. Financial losses caused 
by attacks were estimated by interviewing engineers, managers, operator and accountants. 
The probabilities of attacks were identified based on historical data. The method was 
applied to a test SCADA system at the University of Louisville. 
4.8. Cyber-Terrorism SCADA Risk Framework, 
2009 Error! Reference source not found. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., a cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework 
which is validated by a focus group of five SCADA industry experts is presented. The 
framework consists of three stages: (1) risk assessment, (2) capability assessment model, 
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and (3) controls. 
 The recommendation for the risk assessment stage is to adjust the AS/NZS 
4360:2004, an Australian risk management standard, for the specifics of SCADA systems. 
For the development of the cyber-terrorism capability assessment model, the level of 
cyber-terrorist group capability is characterised using eight indicators: (1) advanced ICT 
skills, (2) advanced hacking tools and techniques, (3) access to new advanced ICTs, (4) 
advanced knowledge of SCADA systems, (5) insiders within the organisation of a 
selected target, (6) reconnaissance, (7) funding, and (8) motivation. 
 The controls stage adopts another Australian standard AS/NZS 27002:2006 for 
information security management and adjusts it to the SCADA context listing eleven 
security control clauses: 
 1. SCADA Security Policy, 
 2. SCADA Physical and Environmental Security, 
 3. SCADA Organisation Information Security, 
 4. SCADA Asset Management, 
 5. SCADA Human Resources Security, 
 6. SCADA Communications and Operations Management, 
 7. SCADA Access Control, 
 8. SCADA Information Systems Acquisition, Development and 
Maintenance, 
 9. SCADA Information Security Incident Management, 
 10. SCADA Business Continuity Management, and 
 11. SCADA Compliance. 
4.9. Evaluating the Risk of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems via Petri Net 
Analysis, 2011 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A methodology for quantifying the risk of cyber attacks on computer network 
operations on SCADA systems is introduced in Error! Reference source not found.. The 
method is based on the Petri Net state coverability analysis and process simulation. The 
purpose of the method is to identify all high-consequence attack states. The method 
avoids the use of such measure as likelihood since it is “difficult to credibly evaluate in 
many practical applications”, but rather represents risk as “a function of the resources to 
which an attacker can gain access during an attack” Error! Reference source not found.. 
The method is demonstrated on a non-automated hazardous liquid loading process which 
is described in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 For the purpose of analysis, first, potential process failure modes with 
corresponding consequences are identified and from them those failure modes are 
separated which may lead to a process failure. Then, the resources needed by an attacker 
to commit an attack are identified. As a result, three Petri net models are designed: 
industrial process model, SCADA operation model and resource-vulnerability topology. 
The resources available to an attacker form prerequisites for a SCADA failure, which in 
its turn may result in one or more process failures. Consequences may be measured in a 
metric meaningful to process owners. As examples such possible metrics as lost 
production throughput and environmental pollution are mentioned. In the example 
provided in the paper, the severity of impact is measured in terms of the number of 
injures to the personnel serving the process. 
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 Two risk metrics are proposed in Error! Reference source not found.: (1) center 
of mass risk measure, which is the median of the set of the consequence of all inducible 
SCADA and process failure modes; and (2) worst-case risk measure, which is a 
maximum value of the set. Six types of failure modes are adopted 
from Error! Reference source not found.. 
4.10. Hierarchical, Model-Based Risk Management of Critical 
Infrastructures, 2009 Error! Reference source not found. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., an approach to risk management based on 
a set of the hierarchical labelled hypergraphs of the security dependencies between the 
components of an infrastructure is elaborated. 
 In this approach an infrastructure hypergraph and an evolution graph, which may 
be regarded as a more detailed variation of an attack graph, are developed. An 
infrastructure hypergraph is a model of the interdependent components of a system 
depicting the internal states of components and operations on them. An evolution graph is 
a directed acyclic graph which consists of the states of an elementary attack committed to 
achieve a final goal. Each evolution describes an attack strategy. For analysis, an 
evolution graph is pruned to remove all evolutions with low probabilities. The probability 
of an attack strategy is defied based on the complexity of actions and resources required 
by an attack, and are based on historical data regarding the occurrence of attacks. 
 A metamathematical framework for the selection of the optimal set of 
countermeasures based on minimal sets and a partial ordering among subsets of 
countermeasures accompanies the approach proposed. 
 Software tools supporting (1) the design of evolution graphs, (2) the pruning of a 
graph (the removal of the nodes and arches selected according to the strategy described in 
the paper) and (3) the choice of countermeasures are developed to facilitate and automate 
the approach proposed. 
 The application of the approach is demonstrated on generic graphs which may 
illustrate a water distribution, a pipeline system or a sales devices data collection 
infrastructure. 
4.11. Network Security Risk Model (NSRM), 
2009 Error! Reference source not found. 
 The Network Security Risk Model (NSRM) is introduced 
in Error! Reference source not found.. The NSRM is a directed graph representing an 
attack. In a graph, nodes depict the components of a system and edges denote linkages 
through which one component may influence another. The purpose of the model is to 
assist with the selection of risk management controls by providing a measure of risk and 
by calculating the measure for a baseline and for a security enhanced versions of a 
system. 
 The application of the model is demonstrated on a simplified crude oil pipeline 
pump station controlled by a SCADA system which is a part of a larger process control 
network. 
 The NSRM comprises eight steps: 
 1. Identify risk metrics specific to a system. In the example presented 
in Error! Reference source not found., risk is measured in terms of the gallons of crude 
oil lost flow per day. Two metrics, expected and extreme event loss production, are 
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examined. 
 2. Decompose a controlled infrastructure in a hierarchical model. 
 3. Characterise process failure modes and effects using Adaptive 
Multi-Player Hierarchical Holographic Modelling (AMP-HHM) 
framework Error! Reference source not found., where in order to get a broader view a 
conflict is examined from the perspectives of both opposing sides. 
 4. Specify model processes and process disruption modes. Process 
specification is developed from a hierarchical model of a system; 
 5. Construct an attack scenario using HHM and AMP-HHM. Each attack 
scenario is characterised by attacker objectives, attacker type and the points of access. 
 6. Characterise network security structure Level and Barrier Diagram 
(ALBD) Error! Reference source not found. which covers success levels, barriers with 
OR and AND junctions. 
 7. Decompose the control network via decomposing the resulting ALBD into 
network components and linkages between them. 
 8. Define process disruption modes and resource requirements in terms of 
component access for each attack scenario. 
 Based on the return, the optimal attackers policy is identified showing which 
components of a system and in what order an attacker may attempt to compromise. A loss 
of crude oil for a baseline systems and the probability of the success of an attack are 
calculated. Next, the same parameters are estimated for a security-enhanced versions of 
the system. The analysis of the trade-offs between risk metrics for each 
security-enhanced version of the system and the cost of the corresponding security 
solutions allows the identification of the optimal security strategy and helps with security 
budgeting. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., a methodology for calculating all 
parameters of the system is provided. It is noted also that due to the lack of statistical data 
and due to the specifics of individual systems, experts must be involved in the estimation 
of parameters involved in the calculation. 
4.12. Attack Countermeasure Tree, 2010 Error! Reference source not found. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., the risk assessment method based on 
Attack Countermeasure Tree (ACT), which enriches a widely used in risk assessment 
concept of an attack tree with information about security countermeasures, is introduced. 
There are three types of events in an ACT: attack event, detection event and mitigation 
event. An ACT may be augmented with the cost of an attack and the amount of security 
investment. The cost of an attack is the cost of the consequences of events leading to an 
attack with the minimal cost and is restricted by the budget of an attacker. 
 Attack scenarios may be produced from an ACT, as well as information extracted 
enabling qualitative and probabilistic security and risk assessment. Qualitative analysis 
allows the identification of the minimal combination of attack events as in any attack tree. 
The probability of an attack may be calculated based on the probabilities of single attack 
events. Formulas or calculating return of investment and return of attack are also 
suggested. 
 An ACT may be used to find the minimum set of defence mechanisms which 
includes at least one defence mechanism from each attack path. If more than one of such 
sets are found then other parameters (e.g. the cost of a set or the probability of an attack) 
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may be used to choose the optimal set. 
 The use of an ACT is demonstrated on a case study of a SCADA attack. The 
analysis in Error! Reference source not found. was performed using a software tool 
SHARPE (Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator), “a 
general hierarchical modeling tool that analyzes stochastic models of reliability, 
availability, performance, and performability” Error! Reference source not found.. The 
optimisation was performed in MATLAB. 
4.13. Adversary-Driven State-Based System Security Evaluation, 
2010 Error! Reference source not found. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., the ADversary VIew Security Evaluation 
(ADVISE) method is proposed. It enriches an attack graph with the characteristics of an 
adversary. The purpose of the method is to simulate an attack on a system, identify the 
most likely attack path and to calculate the probability of the success of an attack using 
an executable state-based security model of a system. 
 The ADVISE method recommends to follow three steps in order to receive an 
answer to a security question: (1) characterise adversaries and system, and specify 
security metrics; (2) developed an executable attack graph describing possible attacks; 
and (3) execute the graph to produce an answer. 
 A security model of a system, an attack execution graph, includes 
security-relevant system characteristics presented as a set of attack steps and the 
characteristics of an adversary. An attack step, an example of which is depicted in Figure 
3, is characterised by attack precondition, execution time, cost, a set of outcomes, 
outcome distribution, detection distribution, payoff and state variable updates. An 
adversary is characterised by two system-independent characteristics (attack preference 
weight and attack skill level) and by three system-dependent characteristics (attack goal, 
system access and system knowledge). 
 In 2011, in the follow up paper Error! Reference source not found. a software 
tool tool that automates the ADVISE method was presented. The tool, which is built upon 
the existing modelling tool Möbius Error! Reference source not found., automates input 
of system and adversary data, and the generation of executable models. 
In Error! Reference source not found., another case study is presented based on the 
comparison of two generic SCADA architectures described in NIST SP 
800-82 Error! Reference source not found. attacked by four types of adversaries. 
4.14. Risk-Assessment Model for Cyber Attacks, 
2010 Error! Reference source not found. 
 Another risk-assessment model for cyber attacks on Information Systems is 
introduced in Error! Reference source not found. and its application is demonstrated on 
a test SCADA system of a chemical plant. The model may be used for risk assessment, 
cost-benefit analysis supporting the acquisition of IT components, and for the calculation 
of insurance premium by insurance companies. 
 Based on the literature review and their research, the authors of the paper 
enumerate seven possible attack types (replay capture, spoofing, denial of service, control 
message modification, write to master terminal unit, write to remote terminal unit and 
remote terminal unit response alteration) and specify six types of loss an attack may 
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cause (control-loss, product-loss, staff-time loss, equipment damage, and prevention) 
along with the probability of type of loss for each type of attack. 
 A loss caused by an attack in Error! Reference source not found. depends on the 
type of an attack and other losses as estimated by chemical plant experts. The paper 
presents a formula for calculating a loss of each type. The prevention cost, for example, is 
calculated as a product of the cost of the upgrade of IT components resistant to a specific 
type of attack and the probability of prevention loss for this attack type. Ultimately, a 
total estimated revenue loss from all types of cyber attacks may be calculated using the 
model proposed. 
 It is mentioned that a tool was developed to automate the loss estimation process 
suggested, but no details regarding the tool is provided. 
4.15. Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructures: Attack and Defense 
Modelling, 2010 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A SCADA security framework RAIM, which consists of four parts (Real-time 
monitoring, Anomaly detection, Impact analysis and Mitigation strategies) is introduced 
in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The real-time monitoring and anomaly detection modules of the framework are 
based on the continuous monitoring of system logs and are needed to collect data for the 
subsequent impact analysis. Impact analysis aims to examine intrusion behaviours and a 
possible impact of a cyber attack on a SCADA system and consists of four steps: (1) 
capturing system configuration in a cybernet; (2) power flow simulation; (3) vulnerability 
index calculation; and (4) security improvement. 
 Impact analysis is based on an attack tree where a cyber security vulnerability 
index shows the likelihood of a leaf of an attack tree being compromised, the likelihood 
of a specific intrusion scenario or of the overall attack. The indices are calculated based 
on historical data regarding intrusions, and information about security countermeasures 
and password policies. The leaf vulnerability index depends on port auditing and 
password strength. 
 The application of the framework is demonstrated on a test subnet of electric 
power control network. 
4.16. Digraph Model for Risk Identification and Management in SCADA 
Systems, 2011 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A digraph model of a SCADA system for a chemical distillation column of a 
laboratory scale is presented in Error! Reference source not found.. The model provides 
a formal representation of the structure and behaviour of a SCADA system and may be 
exploited for risk impact assessment and fault diagnosis. 
 The vertexes of the graph are the components of a SCADA system and a directed 
edge exist between two vertexes if a security risk at an initial vertex may affect security 
of a terminal vertex. The reachability matrix of a graph and its partitioning may be used 
to separate the components that are are more likely to be impacted from those that are 
less likely to be impacted if the component represented by the initial vertex of a digraph 
is found at risk. For fault diagnosis a digraph is used in a deductive manner in a way 
similar to fault trees. It is used to identify the sources of a fault when a fault is observed 
in one of the components. The ancestors of all faulty components form the set of potential 
fault sources. The set is then reduced to one source which is common to all faulty 
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components. The use of digraph for fault diagnoses is exemplified on the scenario where 
a hacker penetrates a corporate network and then injects a SCADA DNP3 traffic with a 
malicious code. 
4.17. Risk Assessment, Detection, and Response, 
2011 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A risk assessment method for sensor networks accompanied by attack detection 
and automatic response modules are presented in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., the standard formula for calculating risk 
as an average loss is accepted and interpreted in the context of a sensor network: 
     =
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where pi - the probability of an attacker compromising sensor i and is accepted to be the 
same for all sensors and Li - a loss resulting from the compromise. 
 The following attack model is proposed which may reflect integrity and DoS 
attacks: 
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i
y k  - a measurement received by the controller at time k; yi(k) - an actual 
measurement; ai(k) - a measurement under attack; and  a  - the duration of an attack. 
 For detecting anomaly, a linear model as an approximation of the behaviour of a 
physical system is developed. Then, anomaly is detected using a non-parametric 
cumulative sum statistic. When anomaly is detected, an automated response to an attack 
is fired while awaiting human actions. 
 The experiments were run to simulate cyber attacks on a chemical reactor 
implemented as a Tennessee-Eastman process control system model presented 
in Error! Reference source not found.. The experiments demonstrated that the risk 
assessment model proposed helps to establish which type of attack and which sensor in a 
network must be given a priority in a security budget. 
4.18. Cyber Security Risk Assessment in Nuclear Power Plants, 
2012 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A cyber security risk assessment methodology that may be exploited in the 
process of the design of instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants is 
suggested in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The methodology outlines six steps that must be undertaken in order to conduct 
cyber security risk assessment during the system and component design, and equipment 
supply stages: 
 1. System identification and cyber security modelling, 
 2. Asset and impact analysis, 
 3. Threat analysis, 
 4. Vulnerability analysis, 
 5. Security control design, and 
 6. Penetration test. 
 The paper describes the activities that must be undertaken during each step by 
summarising the relevant NIST standards. Possible attack scenarios are listed to be used 
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in threat analysis. As for vulnerability analysis, it is recommended to use an existing lists 
of vulnerabilities and adapt them to the specifics of a system under analysis. Security 
controls may be adopted from relevant NIST standards (e.g. NIST SP 
800-82 Error! Reference source not found.). Finally, security control design must be 
validated by means of vulnerability scans and penetration tests. 
4.19. Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes, 
2012 Error! Reference source not found. 
 The Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP) modelling approach is 
described in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The BDMP formalism, which combines fault trees with Markov processes, 
facilitates the modelling of an attack on a system. Qualitative and quantitative outcome 
useful for risk assessment may be produced from a BDMP model. 
 The BDMP formalism uses the following modelling objects: (1) leaves for attack 
modelling, namely Attacker Action, Timed Security Event and Instantaneous Security 
Event; (2) gates such as AND and OR, and several specific gates; and (3) links including 
classical logic links and two specific links, Trigger Link and Before Link. An example of 
the STUXNET attack model rendered using the BDPM modelling approach is presented 
in Error! Reference source not found.. A leaf of a BDPM model is characterised by 
success rate and probability. All attack paths may be identified and ordered by their 
probabilities or by effect on attack success. 
 The quantitative analysis of the STUXNET BDPM model 
in Error! Reference source not found. was performed using modelling tool 
KB3 Error! Reference source not found.. The probabilities and success rates of the 
leaves of the model were quantified by the authors of the paper “based on [their] own 
estimation and writings by security consultants” Error! Reference source not found.. 
4.20. A CORAS-based Risk Assessment for SCADA, 
2012 Error! Reference source not found. 
 CORAS [49, 50] is a model-based risk assessment method designed for security 
critical systems. It is based on ISO/IEC 31000. CORAS is designed for “security-critical 
systems in general, but puts particular emphasis on IT 
security” Error! Reference source not found.. CORAS covers the entire risk 
management process and heavily uses models at many stages of risk management. 
 There is a large number of publications related to CORAS
2
. In this paper, we 
analyse only the publication related to the application of CORAS in the context of a 
SCADA system, namely Error! Reference source not found.. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., CORAS is used for the risk analysis of a 
SCADA system. First, assets and their levels of importance are identified. Then, threats 
and vulnerabilities are listed. Finally, using the CORAS modelling language a set of 
threat diagrams is developed. The threat diagrams presented in the paper were created as 
a result of a brainstorming session in which security and risk experts participated along 
with system stakeholders. 
 The paper reports only preliminary results of a research project and outlines an 
                                                     
2
http://coras.sourceforge.net/online_documentation.html 
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extensive future work. In the main, Error! Reference source not found. demonstrates that 
the CORAS modelling language is useful for threat modelling in the context of a SCADA 
system. 
4.21. A PMU-based Risk Assessment Framework for Power Control 
Systems, 2013 Error! Reference source not found. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., a Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)-based 
risk assessment framework for SCADA systems of power grids is introduced. The 
application of the framework is demonstrated using a simulation on the IEEE 10 
Generator 39 Bus System. 
 The steps of the framework as described below. First, the configuration of a 
system is identified. Next, vulnerabilities within the system are identified and quantified 
using the Duality Element Relative Fuzzy Evaluation Method (DERFEM). Then, an 
attack graph is designed and used in order to find intrusion scenarios, the probabilities of 
which are also calculated. 
 In addition, the paper presents System Stability Monitoring and Response System 
(SSMARS). SSMARS is an on-line scheme based on PMU data. It monitors the impact 
of adversary events on a power system in real time and induces control actions to control 
voltage when needed. 
4.22. Improved Risk Assessment Method for SCADA Information Security, 
2014 Error! Reference source not found. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., a modification of a traditional method for 
calculating the effectiveness of intrusion, detection and prevention systems in terms of 
averting a specific class of attacks on a system is presented. The purpose of the method is 
to “allow the determination of the optimum level of security investment and definition of 
different levels of acceptable risk”. The method, according to its authors, enables a more 
precise calculation of loss expectancy than any other method. This is achieved by taking 
into account the strength of an attack and its effect on the system performance, which is 
measured using weighing factors. 
 The following formula is introduced in Error! Reference source not found. for 
calculating Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE): 
    
=1 =1
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A i j
i j
ALE W W D L ARO    (6) 
where WA - weighting factor, which scales maximum direct losses depending on the 
strength of attack; N - the number of conditions contributing to indirect losses; W - 
indirect costs resulting from a condition; M - the number of loss types; and ARO - the 
annual rate of the occurrence of an attack, which is defined based on the analysis of 
historical data. 
 Return on Security Investment (ROSI) is then calculated as follows: 
   = ( % ) / 
S S
ROSI ALE RiskMitigated C C    (7) 
where CS is the cost of implemented security controls. 
 The application of the method is demonstrated on a case study of a run-off-river 
hydro-power plant. 
4.23. Cyber-Security Analysis of Smart Grid SCADA Systems with Game 
Models, 2014 Error! Reference source not found. 
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 The application of game theory to a cyber security analysis of a smart grid 
SCADA system is discussed in Error! Reference source not found.. The interaction 
between an attacker and a defender (a SCADA system administrator) is modelled as a 
two-player, non-cooperative, sequential, perfect information and non-zero sum game. 
The approach is demonstrated on a case study of the sensor network of a smart grid 
SCADA system. 
 Within the approach, a game tree is developed and populated with players’ 
payoffs. In order to develop a game tree, first, the following possible actions of an 
attacker are defined: aS - Sybil attack, an attacker deploys a malicious (Sybil) sensor 
device, which acts as a legitimate sensor; 
NC
a  - node compromise, ae - eavesdropping; 
DI
a  - data injection; and 
NIL
a  - no attack action. Then, the possible defender response 
modes are defined as rc - cut-off energy to a sensor, ra - alert MTU, and rm - maintain 
correct data and valid nodes. 
 The following formula for calculating an impact of an action a is presented 
in Error! Reference source not found.: 
   ( ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) 
c i a
Impact a w C a w I a w A a    (8) 
where wc, wi, and wa are the weights of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
respectively and  ( ), ( )C a I a  and A(a) are the impacts of action a on confidentiality, 
integrity and availability respectively. The parameters in this formula are quantified 
based on expert opinion and historical data. The payoff of a player at a current decision 
node is calculated as a sum of his previous payoff at the parent node and the current 
payoff, which is a function of the impact of the current action on the player. Game theory 
analysis in Error! Reference source not found. helps to identify a payoff of an attacker 
and defender at each step and to establish the strategies with the best payoff for both 
players. 
4.24. Quantitative Methodology to Assess Cyber Security Risk of SCADA 
Systems, 2014 Error! Reference source not found. 
 A methodology for quantitative assessment of cyber security risk in SCADA 
systems based on the optimal power flow and power flow tracing is introduced 
in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The fifteen types of threats and the four components of a SCADA system (EMS 
server, a SCADA server, RTU and communication network) are distinguished 
in Error! Reference source not found.. For the quantification of vulnerabilities, first, the 
relevance of each threat to each component is defined. Then, a vulnerability index is 
assigned to each component of a system. The vulnerability index of a component is based 
on historical data, where available, and on the security characteristics of the component. 
For the quantification of threats, a normalised weighted index is assigned to each type of 
threat for each component of a SCADA system. It is based on the applicability of the 
treat to the component, the vulnerability index of the component and the damage capacity 
of the component. The asset value is calculated based on the outage cost. 
 The optimal power flow is estimated as a minimal power generation cost for all 
generators under the restrictions on generators and line capacities. The power flow 
tracing method, which is based on the graph theory, is then used to examined the 
interdependencies between generators and load terminals in order to calculate outage cost 
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for each component of a SCADA system. 
 Finally, risk is calculated in monetary terms as a product of the probabilities of a 
threat and vulnerability, and of the cost of an asset. 
5. Summary Analysis and Key Findings 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 The list of the risk assessment methods described in the previous section is 
summarised in Table 1. In Table 1, country is the country of the first author of the paper 
and citations is the number of citations of the paper according to Google Scholar Citation 
Index as on 12 January 2015. 
 The number of papers covering risk assessment in SCADA produced between 
2004 and 2014 vary between 0 and 4 per year (Figure 4). No noticeable increase in the 
number of papers over time is encountered. Among the papers analysed, the research 
from the following countries France, Canada, China, Australia, Serbia, Ireland and Italy 
is represented by one paper each. Two papers originate from Korea, while the majority 
(15 papers) are produced by researchers from the USA. 
 The largest number of citations (104) is acquired 
by Error! Reference source not found. published in 2011. It is worth noting here 
that Error! Reference source not found. covers the scope broader than risk assessment 
and describes also modules for attack detection and automated response to an attack. The 
second most cited paper among analysed, with 87 citations, 
is Error! Reference source not found. which is published in 2010 and which introduces 
the four component (real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analysis and 
mitigation strategies) security framework for SCADA systems. The third most cited 
paper, with 85 citations, is Error! Reference source not found. which is published in 
2004 and describes the use of attack trees for assessing vulnerabilities in SCADA 
systems. 
5.2. Categorisation of the Methods 
 Most often, risk assessment methods in general are classified into qualitative and 
quantitative [30, 31, 32], with semi-quantitative methods being distinguished in some 
publications [32, 33]. While qualitative methods use a subjective classification of risk 
(e.g. low-medium-high), quantitative methods strive to measure risk numerically. The 
majority of quantitative methods are probabilistic. The difficulties of the quantitative 
measurement of security which hold in the risk quantification context also are discussed 
in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 Alternatively, risk assessment methods are classified into traditional assessments 
and baseline controls Error! Reference source not found.. 
In Error! Reference source not found., a new classification scheme for risk assessment 
methods is suggested. It separates methods into nine categories according to the approach 
used, and the level of the involvement of a risk expert and system owner. 
 Risk assessment methods based on graphs are widespread. Tree-based risk 
assessment methods (e.g. fault tree, attack tree, event tree, vulnerability tree and various 
combinations of the above) as well as other risk assessment methods based on directed 
graphs fall under the category of probabilistic methods. Tree-based methods are similar 
in their logic and aim to define the probability of the top event or its 
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reliability Error! Reference source not found.. What constitutes the major difference 
between various tree-based methods is the top event. In [7, 13, 31, 36], among 
probabilistic tree-based methods for SCADA systems inductive and deductive methods 
are distinguished. Inductive methods (e.g event tree) trace from possible causes to 
undesired events as opposed to deductive methods (e.g. fault and attack trees), which 
trace from undesired events to possible causes Error! Reference source not found.. 
Inductive methods are also referred to as forward search techniques, while deductive 
methods are referred to as backward search 
techniques Error! Reference source not found.. 
 As pointed out in [6, 7], risk assessment methods as applied to SCADA systems 
are difficult to categorise. Based on the analysis presented in this paper, we suggest an 
intuitive categorisation for the methods examined. This classification scheme is generic 
and we foresee that it may be applied to other domains. 
 First, the methods examined may be categorised by the level of detail and 
coverage as follows: 
 • Guidelines - outline a set of steps for a user to follow either assuming that 
the user knows how to perform each step or, in better cases, providing references to 
specific methods that may be exploited. An exhaustive description of activities within 
each step is absent. Guidelines strive to cover the majority of the stages of the risk 
management process. The coverage of the stages by guidelines is broad, while the level 
of detail provided is low. 
 • Activity-specific methods - focus on and in depth examine a specific 
activity performed at a certain stage of the risk management process. The level of detail 
here is high, while the coverage in terms of the stages of the risk management process is 
narrow. 
 • Elaborated guidelines - are the combinations of the two categories listed 
above. Elaborated guidelines provide a coarse outline of many or even all stages of the 
risk management process and concentrate particularly on one or more specific activities 
within the process. The coverage of the risk management process stages here is broad and 
the level of detail provided is high. 
 The categorisation of the methods analysed into guidelines, activity-specific 
methods and elaborated guidelines is summarised in Table 2, which shows that the 
majority of the methods examined fall under the category of activity-specific methods. 
 Second, the risk assessment methods examined may be split into: 
 • Formula-based methods - these methods are based on mathematical 
models of risk. A formula-based method consists of a set of formulas to calculate risk or 
impact. These methods do not use any models to support risk assessment, but represent 
supporting information in a tabular or textual form. 
 • Model-based methods - in these methods risk analysis is based on a 
graphical model. These methods, in the majority of cases, are supported by mathematical 
models as well to enable qualitative and typically probabilistic analysis. Among 
model-based methods one may separate graph-based methods and methods based on 
other types of models (e.g. HHM). 
 Table 4 shows the categorisation of the papers examined into formula- and 
model-based methods. The majority of the methods are based on graphs or their multiple 
variations as Table 4 hints at. Attack trees are used in the large number of proposals. 
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Many attack-tree-based methods either enrich an attack tree with additional data or 
combine it with the models of other types (Table 4). 
 Three of the papers examined, namely [61, 75, 57], we were not able to assign to 
either formula- or model-based category since the papers are guidelines, and the specific 
methods of analysis within these guidelines must be chosen by users. 
 As Table 4 also shows that among the model-based methods, the vast majority are 
attack- or failure-oriented, while only three methods [11, 23, 63] are goal-oriented. More 
precisely, Error! Reference source not found. exploits dual approach, while 
infrastructure hypergraph may be attributed to the goal-oriented approach, evolution 
graph belongs to the attack-oriented approach. The goal-oriented approach focuses on 
positive outcomes and bring together the elements that an organisation’s 
success Error! Reference source not found. as opposed to failure-oriented approach that 
concentrates around the identification of all possible types of attack and failure modes. 
 Traditionally, we also split the risk assessment methods examined into qualitative 
and quantitative as summarised in Table 3. More than a half of the methods examined are 
probabilistic. Three methods are quantitative, but do not use the notion of probability in 
their quantification of risk. Five out of the methods examined are qualitative. 
5.3. Probabilistic Methods 
 Table 3 indicates that Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods are widely 
used in risk assessment of SCADA systems. However, PRA methods suffer from a range 
of disadvantages [6, 11, 89]: 
 • The estimation of risk is never complete in the mathematical sense. The 
reader may want to return to Formula 1, where a complete set of undesired events is 
never known. 
 • No way is provided to deal with hitherto unknown vulnerabilities, attacks 
or failure modes. 
 • Continuous revision is required. In Formula 1, a revision is needed in 
order to keep a set of undesired events as complete as possible reflecting the rapidly 
evolving cyber security domain, or, turning to Formula 2, to keep the set of known 
vulnerabilities and threats up-to-date. In 1979, it was stated: “It is conceptually 
impossible to be complete in a mathematical sense in the construction of event-trees and 
fault-trees; what matters is the approach to completeness and the ability to demonstrate 
with reasonable assurance that only small contributions are omitted. This inherent 
limitation means that any calculation using this methodology is always subject to revision 
and to doubt as to its completeness” Error! Reference source not found.. Attack and 
vulnerability trees, which belong to PRA methods, usually concentrate on a specific type 
of attack and at best attempt to cover “all known threats and vulnerabilities in an 
infrastructure” [31, p.484], ignoring unknown threats. 
In Error! Reference source not found., it is declared that “in very large and complex 
situations the exhaustive computation of all possible attacks is often impossible or simply 
not practical.” 
 • Context establishment, upon which risk identification draws, is not given 
direct attention (Section 5.7). 
 • Methods rely either on historical system data, which is difficult to access, 
or on subjective data (Section 5.4). The availability of objective data for analysis limits 
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the applicability of many PRA methods. In Error! Reference source not found., it is 
recommended to “avoid use of the probabilistic risk analysis methodology for the 
determination of absolute risk probabilities for subsystems unless an adequate data base 
exists and it is possible to quantify the uncertainties.” 
 • Indirect, non-linear and feedback relationships that characterise many 
incidents in SCADA systems are not accounted for. 
 • Numerous simplifying assumptions, which do not always hold in real life, 
are made. For example, a few of the assumptions encountered by this analysis are 
“adversaries are like managers of multinational corporations who make rational choices 
investments and expected returns” Error! Reference source not found., “the 
vulnerabilities of each component C are known” Error! Reference source not found., 
perfect information of an attacker and a system administrator when “both players know 
what has happened to the system so far before making their decision on the next 
move” Error! Reference source not found. and “the defender will not take any action to 
defend the system unless an attack action occurs” Error! Reference source not found.. 
The examples of other assumptions are the independence of security events, the 
stationarity of a system over time or similarities with other systems, the use of the 
aggregation of security numbers related to the different components of a system 
overlooking mutual interdependencies Error! Reference source not found.. A method 
based on wrong assumptions may highly likely produce incorrect results. 
 • Methods do not effectively cope with risks with low probabilities, but 
extreme, catastrophic consequences Error! Reference source not found.. For predicting 
catastrophic events such as for example 9/11, Fukushima and Chernobyl frequency-based 
statistical methods on which PRA methods rely have little value [89, 93]. 
 Despite their drawbacks PRA methods are popular among the researchers and 
practitioners predominantly because they provide a convenient numeric estimation of risk 
which assists security decision-makers with the understanding of the security posture of 
an organisation and with the allocation of security funds. 
5.4. Sources of Probabilistic Data 
 Table 5 shows that in the methods examined probabilities used for the calculation 
of risk or impact are derived based on historical data (e.g. incident logs as 
in Error! Reference source not found.), expert judgement or both. In five methods, we 
were not able to find any indication of where probabilistic data come from. 
 PRA methods typically use probabilistic data to measure at least one or several 
metrics, e.g. vulnerability existence, vulnerability severity, attack frequency, loss 
occurrence, detection and mitigation rates, attack step success and overall attack success 
to name just a few. Hence, the success of a PRA method strongly depends on the quality 
of estimated probabilities, which ideally should originate from objective empirical rather 
than hypothetical data. Objective data in this instance is data received from statistical 
sampling, historical records or experimentation Error! Reference source not found.. 
 The authors of the methods examined point out that data required for the effective 
estimation of risk is rarely available [18, 83] and, therefore, research often has to rely on 
artificial data Error! Reference source not found.. Objective data may often be 
unavailable due to various reasons: hardware and software specifics, legacy and 
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confidentiality. Undoubtedly, this issue hinders the validation of the methods, and 
diminishes the trustworthiness of risk assessment results. 
 In Error! Reference source not found., the authors consciously avoid the use of 
probabilistic data, but characterise security by median loss and maximum loss. However, 
this approach is based on the assumption that it is possible to identify a complete set of 
all failure and attack modes. This assumption is open to argument. 
 In the method examined where expert opinion is used little or no detail is 
provided as to how the opinion was captured and analysed. Ultimately, this is a crucial 
point of any expert opinion-based method since the correctness of risk estimation is 
founded in the precision of the probabilities involved in the calculation. 
5.5. Domain and Aim 
 More meticulous overview of the methods examined is summarised in Table 6, 
where the domain, aim and evaluation route are outlined for each method. 
 The risk assessment methods are developed for and applied to a range of domains 
including power grids, chemical plants, pump systems and rail road sector. Table 6 shows 
that eleven out of twenty four proposals deal with SCADA systems in power sector 
considering smart grids, hydro power and nuclear power plants. Four proposals [61, 63, 
67, 78] do not mention any specific sector, but discuss SCADA systems in general. 
 The methods examined vary significantly in terms of their aims because their 
cover different stages of the risk management process or different activities within the 
same stage. While one method Error! Reference source not found. aims to list and 
discuss risk assessment activities to be undertaken at the system design stage, four 
methods [11, 57, 59, 72] target to identify vulnerabilities and/or to quantify the level of 
vulnerability of a system. The method presented in Error! Reference source not found.
 strives to identify sources of risk. The declared aim of three methods [31, 63, 67] is the 
assistance with the selection of an optimal set of countermeasures. 
5.6. Evaluation 
 As Table 6 indicates the vast majority of methods are evaluated by means of a 
single case study or example. A case study or an example is typically based on a generic 
and simplified model of a system or on a testbed. In some instances, a method is not 
demonstrated in full, only some activities within the method are dealt with in a case study 
(e.g. Error! Reference source not found.) In three proposals [23, 57, 59] no discussion of 
a method evaluation was found. The application of a method to a real world system is 
declared as future work in several proposals (e.g. Error! Reference source not found.). 
Only in two papers, namely [18, 71], it is explicitly mentioned that the method was 
applied to a real system. In Error! Reference source not found., the validity of an attack 
tree is evaluated by energy sector operators and the feasibility of attacks is tested in a 
laboratory setting. In Error! Reference source not found., the guideline aiming at 
protection of SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism within Australia is 
evaluated by a focus group of five SCADA system consultants. 
 Unsurprisingly, the analysis of the risk assessment methods for SCADA systems 
in terms of their evaluation leads to a conclusion that it is easier to propose a method than 
to evaluate it in a sustainable rigorous manner. The methods are rarely, apart from a few 
exceptions, discussed with industry experts (Table 6). Since the methods are not applied 
to real systems, the validity or practicality of the results rendered by a method are also 
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not evaluated by industry experts. 
 In few cases, where a method is applied to a real system, a system is accessed 
only once and is not revisited again for retesting or regarding the feedback on the 
usefulness and effectiveness of the method. 
 For the qualitative methods it is not discussed whether the outcome produced by 
the method gives a sufficiently accurate description of risk. The same is true for 
quantitative methods. In Error! Reference source not found., the method is said to 
“enable a coarse quantification of the attack success probability”, but it is not validated 
whether the quantification suggested is accurate enough to back up security decisions. 
 In the methods examined, the formulas provided for the quantification of risk, 
impact or attack probabilities are typically not proved in a mathematical sense. The proof 
is often limited to the statements like in Error! Reference source not found. saying that 
the formulas suggested have “intuitive meaning for the analysts, testers, and control 
system users” and are “clear, reasonably intuitive, and sufficiently well-defined to guide 
the analysis of the proposed method”. Unfortunately, what is intuitive and clear vary 
from person to person and is very subjective. 
5.7. Stages of Risk Management 
 The process of risk management, as it is adopted in ISO 
31000:2009(E) Error! Reference source not found. and ISO/IEC 
27005:2011 Error! Reference source not found., is depicted in Figure 5. 
 ISO 31000:2009(E) Error! Reference source not found. provides the following 
definitions for risk management and risk assessment: 
 Risk management - “coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation 
with regard to risk” [21, Def. 2.2]; 
 Risk assessment - “overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation” [21, Def. 2.2], where risk identification is the “process of finding, 
recognizing and describing risks” [21, Def. 2.15], risk analysis is the “process to 
comprehend the nature of risk and to determine the level of risk” [21, Def. 2.21] and risk 
evaluation is the “process of comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria to 
determine whether the risk and/or its magnitude is acceptable or tolerable” [21, Def. 
2.24]. 
 Table 7 shows which stages of the risk management process are addressed by 
each method. The stages and their definitions are adopted as outlined in ISO 
31000:2009(E) Error! Reference source not found. and ISO/IEC 
27005:2011 Error! Reference source not found.. 
 In Table 7 the cell is left empty if the stage is not addressed by a method;  
means that the stage is addressed in detail; and  denotes that the stage is partially 
addressed (i.e. it is briefly outlined, but no detailed recommendations on the execution of 
the activities associated with the stage are provided). The last column of Table 7 
describes the metrics analysed or measured by the methods. 
 According to Table 7, the vast majority of methods concentrates on the risk 
identification and risk analysis stages of the risk management process, while other stages 
receive noticeably less attention. 
 Little or no attention is devoted to the risk evaluation stage. Quantitative risk 
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metrics are often hard to be judged on an absolute scale and require a basis for relative 
comparison to support security decision-making. We did not encounter an explicit 
process of comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria in the proposals. In the 
majority of the papers also no discussion was found regarding whether resulting risk 
metrics, such as vulnerability index or impact are acceptable or tolerable. There are 
though several proposals [18, 31, 64, 69], which we mark with  regarding risk 
evaluation in Table 7, where the comparison of risk metrics is performed between 
different security configurations of a system. 
 It is hard to overestimate the importance of the context establishment stage. Risk 
management decisions must be well-informed and based on an in-depth knowledge of a 
system and its environment. A complete set of risks to a system may not be identified 
without an understanding of system configuration, interactions with other systems, 
stakeholders’ goals, rights and responsibilities, and human-machine interactions. During 
the context establishment stage an organisation examines its structure, current security 
posture, specifies security goals and security strategy, investigates possible external 
influences Error! Reference source not found.. This stage facilitates the scoping and 
focusing of the process, e.g. the identification of critical assets calling for larger security 
investment. 
 Our analysis indicates that the quantitative probabilistic methods in general do not 
concentrate on the context establishment stage. In the majority of the papers where 
context establishment is addressed it is limited to the understanding of a system or 
network configuration. Consequently, only risks associated with the ICT components of a 
SCADA system are taken into account by a risk assessment method while overlooking a 
large number of risks arising from non-technical aspects. 
 Among all methods examined only Error! Reference source not found. is 
exclusively dedicated to the understanding of a SCADA system. The holographic model 
of a SCADA system presented in Error! Reference source not found. addresses an 
extensive range of technical and non-technical subtopics relevant to various aspects of the 
system. These subtopics are ultimately the sources of risk to a SCADA system. 
5.8. Key Concepts and Impact Measurement 
 The following key concepts of risk management are widely acknowledged in the 
literature: system (asset), vulnerability, threat, impact (consequence) and security control 
(countermeasure) [13, 17, 33, 34, 78]. Table 8 shows which key concepts of the risk 
management domain are addressed by the methods examined. The term system or asset is 
used here in a wider sense and refers to people, knowledge, the structure of the system 
and its organisation rather than purely to the technical equipment of a SCADA system. 
 Table 8 confirms the conclusions drawn in the previous section about insufficient 
attention to context establishment by indicating that only 9 methods address the 
system/asset concept. Attacks are dealt with by 18 methods, while risk impact is 
measured in 15 proposals. A fewer proposals address vulnerabilities and countermeasures, 
14 and 12 respectively. A minute description of the concepts analysed or measured by the 
methods could be found in the last column of Table 7. 
 One of the major requirements to a risk assessment method is to produce simple 
key security indicators which would enable senior management and security experts to 
take well-informed security decisions without getting lost in technical 
detail Error! Reference source not found.. Therefore, the choice of key indicators and 
Page 29 of 50
their metrics is important. 
 The analysis confirms that impact or consequences are typically measured in 
monetary terms. In Error! Reference source not found., the impact is measured in 
monetary terms plus a number of human lives. In [72, 80], numeric indices are proposed. 
Several methods point out that risk or impact indicators (and, consequently, their 
measurement) must be chosen in collaboration with system managers and must be 
meaningful in the context of a specific organisation or domain. 
5.9. Tool Support 
 In the vast majority of the proposals examined (17 out of 24) no software 
prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed. In several papers the development 
of a software prototype is outlined as a subject of future work (e.g. [18, 68]). 
 Out of twenty four papers examined a software prototype or tool supporting the 
method is discussed only in seven papers, namely [63, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 76]. In four out 
of these proposals, supporting software is based on the existing tools. 
In Error! Reference source not found., the authors use the existing tools SHARPE and 
MATLAB. In Error! Reference source not found., the prototype is based on the existing 
modelling tool Möbius. In Error! Reference source not found., the tool builds upon 
MATLAB and uses FORTRAN. In Error! Reference source not found., another existing 
tool, KB3, automates risk assessment method proposed. 
 Even in the small number of the papers where tool support is discussed, the 
information regarding a tool is extremely scarce and most often is simply limited to the 
statement that a tool was developed (e.g. in [72, 71]). Neither the architecture of a tool 
nor user interface are demonstrated. 
6. Research Challenges 
6.1. Dealing with Fragmentation 
 We encountered a certain level of fragmentation in terms of addressing the stages 
of the risk management process. In particular, little attention is paid to the context 
establishment stage of the risk management process. Any risk assessment method would 
benefit from an in-depth understanding of a SCADA system, its components and the 
interdependencies between them, and external factors affecting it. The methods often 
either try to cover many stages of the process at the expense of the level of detail or focus 
on one stage providing no instructions regarding the other stages. There is clearly a need 
for a comprehensive method which would cover all sages of the risk management process 
and deal with all key risk management concepts. 
 Little attention is received by the context establishment stage. It is typically 
assumed that a user of a risk assessment system knows the system and its 
interdependencies well. However, due to the inherent complexity of SCADA systems 
such assumption is hardly always true. Also when establishing the context at the initial 
stage of the risk management process often only the technical aspect of a SCADA system 
is addressed. In future, risk assessment methods may draw upon more definite account of 
the human factor, individual knowledge, personnel cyber security awareness, 
organisational cyber security culture and business processes. 
6.2. Overcoming Attack- or Failure-Orientation 
 As a result of the concentration on threats and vulnerabilities during the risk 
management process, rather than on system itself the vast majority of the risk assessment 
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methods examined are failure-oriented (Table 4). Thus, “[u]nderstanding consequences 
and estimating likelihood from cause-related logic trees seem to be pre-requisites of any 
approach to analyzing risks in a system ... ” [94, p.5]. 
 However, as noted earlier in the paper, it is not always feasible to envision all 
possible failure modes or attacks. We see the application of a goal-oriented approach to 
risk management Error! Reference source not found., which would support risk 
management even in situations where a comprehensive list of failure modes or attack 
types may not be established, as one of the research challenges of the field. Approaching 
risk management from the positivist top-down perspective by identifying the elements 
and dependencies within a SCADA system that are required in order for a system to be 
operational, safe and secure offers a more solid understanding of a system and risk 
factors facing it as opposed to the failure-oriented perspective, which is by definition 
incomplete. 
 We believe that the use a goal-oriented dependency modelling 
approach Error! Reference source not found. in the context of SCADA systems offers 
multiple benefits including the overcoming failure-orientation. A dependency model 
focuses on positive outcomes and elements required by an organisation for smooth, safe 
and secure operation. A dependency model is developed by asking What does the 
successful operation of a system depend upon? rather than by examining system failure 
modes. It is not restricted to the boundaries of an organisation and it does not rely on 
historical data or on the completeness of the list of potential 
threats Error! Reference source not found.. Linking to the previously outlined research 
challenge, a dependency model, which provides an insight into more fundamental aspects 
of a SCADA system, might support the context establishment stage as well as risk 
identification and assessment stages of the risk management process. 
 The development of a model of a SCADA system is an arduous task. Both 
qualitative and quantitative parameters of a dependency model of SCADA system are 
hard to establish and require reliable statistical data, and the involvement of SCADA and 
security experts. In future research, a method must be developed for updating the 
qualitative parameters of a dependency model of a SCADA system dynamically based on 
the information extracted from SCADA system models of other types, e.g. 
security-annotated business process models or UML class diagrams with security profiles. 
A method must automate the process of the creation and refreshing of a dependency 
model of a SCADA system by pulling together in a consistent way security related 
information from other models developed while designing a secure SCADA system. 
6.3. Search for Reliable Sources of Data 
 Despite their drawbacks, PRA methods prevail over qualitative and quantitative 
non-probabilistic methods. One of the major obstacles for PRA methods is the lack of 
objective accurate data for the calculation of probabilities involved in risk assessment. In 
2007, one of the studies on SCADA systems cyber security reported that“accurate 
historical data on cyber impacts was badly lacking in the SCADA or process industries 
thus making accurate risk assessment extremely 
difficult” Error! Reference source not found.. 
 In order to deal with the absence of historical system data, several methods are 
discussed in the literature: 
 • The use SCADA test platforms to collect experimental data on threats and 
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vulnerabilities. 
 SCADA testbeds may fill up the lack of historical data by building up 
vulnerability and attack databases Error! Reference source not found.. Controlled 
simulations on test platforms may help to collect statistics regarding vulnerability 
existence and severity, and attack success rates Error! Reference source not found.. 
There is a range of SCADA testbeds developed by universities across the world [83, 87]. 
 • The development of databases of security incidents in SCADA systems, 
 A number of CNI, ICS and SCADA systems security databases exist, e.g. the 
RISI database Error! Reference source not found., which is mentioned earlier in this 
section, and the Industrial Security Incident Database 
(ISID) Error! Reference source not found.. Vulnerability databases accounting for 
SCADA systems are listed in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 • The improvement of information sharing across research and industry, and 
 Although information sharing initiatives exist (e.g. in order to facilitate 
information exchange, the European SCADA and Control Systems Information Exchange 
(EUROSCSIE) was established under the initiative of the 
CPNI Error! Reference source not found.) they do not typically involve researchers to 
the desirable degree. Many authors highlight that it is complicated or even virtually 
impossible for researchers to access realistic data regarding structure, threats and 
vulnerabilities of SCADA systems. 
 • Reliance on expert judgement and its formalisation. 
 In order to deal with the absence of historical data, some PRA methods rely on 
subjective data such as expert opinion (see Table 5). In some cases, expert opinion is 
more easily available and may even be more valuable than historical data. 
 However, risk assessment methods, which rely on expert opinion must devote 
more attention to techniques for capturing, formalising and ultimately turning into 
numeric values expert knowledge. 
 In 2007, in Error! Reference source not found. it was mentioned that a “natural 
extension to PRA involves the use of fuzzy concepts, though this approach has not been 
published for use in SCADA system security risk assessment.” In our analysis, we found 
only one method which uses fuzzy logic. In Error! Reference source not found., the 
Duality Element Relative Fuzzy Evaluation Method (DERFEM) is exploited for 
quantifying the severity of vulnerabilities. Thus, while fuzzy methods seem promising in 
SCADA risk assessment their current application is limited. 
6.4. Improving Validation of Risk Assessment Methods 
 According to Error! Reference source not found., methods for quantifying 
security are in general weakly justified. Section 5.6 also confirms that there is room for 
improvement regarding the rigorous multi-aspect evaluation of risk assessment methods 
for SCADA systems. 
 Researchers rarely have a chance to evaluate their methods on real case studies 
and have to be satisfied with the demonstration of their methods on generic simplified 
examples. The testing of methods in practice with security, risk and SCADA experts, and 
with managers responsible for security decision-making is invaluable. It may help to 
evaluate whether a method accounts for the perspectives of multiple stakeholders and 
conveys cyber security risks in a clear form accessible to non-technical managerial staff 
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and SCADA experts lacking security background. 
 The general guidance on choosing an evaluation method (or a combination of 
them) could be found in Error! Reference source not found., where methods are 
categorised into naturalistic (evaluation in real settings) and artificial (evaluation in 
laboratory settings, analytical evaluation, simulations etc.) as well as ex ante (evaluation 
of an uninstantiated artifact) and ex post (evaluation of an instantiated artifact). The 
authors of risk assessment methods may evaluate the process of risk assessment they 
propose or the outcome of it or both. As inspired by 
in Error! Reference source not found., a risk assessment methods may be evaluated for 
the following purposes: (1) to establish its utility and efficacy for achieving its declared 
purpose; (2) to evaluate the method or theory supporting a risk assessment method; (3) to 
compare a risk assessment method with other methods in ability to achieve the same 
purpose; and (4) to identify weaknesses and ways for improvement of a risk assessment 
method. 
 The authors of risk assessment methods must be clear about which criterion they 
evaluate their method against. A “good” risk analysis method shall be (1) comprehensive, 
(2) adherent to evidence, (3) logically sound, (4) practical and politically acceptable, (5) 
open to evaluation, (6) based on explicit assumptions and premises, (7) compatible with 
the institutions, (8) conducive to learning, (9) attuned to risk communication, and (10) 
innovative Error! Reference source not found.. Compliance with each of these ten 
criteria may be tested. A risk assessment method may also be evaluated regarding its 
fitness for purpose, ease to learn and use, the ability of the method to generate correct 
result, the effectiveness in achieving its goal, efficacy, ethicality, elegance and in terms of 
acceptance by practitioners [96, 95]. 
 The Method Evaluation Model (MEM) Error! Reference source not found. is one 
of the possible frameworks to back up the evaluation of a risk assessment method. The 
MEM builds upon and adapts the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM) Error! Reference source not found. for the evaluation of system design methods 
and modelling languages. The TAM is a well accepted in the IS literature as a theoretical 
model for the evaluation of technology acceptance Error! Reference source not found.. 
The MEM facilitates the empirical evaluation of the ease of use, usefulness and intention 
to use a method. Intention to use a method may serve as an indicator of whether the 
method might gain traction in industry. 
 A comparative evaluation of risk assessment methods for SCADA systems might 
demonstrate advantages and disadvantages of methods, and assist practitioners with the 
choice of the the suitable method. Over the last several years the MEM was actively used 
as a framework for the comparative evaluation of security and risk identification and 
analysis methods [98, 99, 101, 100]. 
6.5. Supporting Risk Management Methods with Elaborate Tools 
 The benefits of software tools supporting risk assessment and management 
activities are undisputed. Tools may facilitate data input for risk assessment in an 
intuitive user-friendly manner, automatically generate and analyse risk models, 
recommend security countermeasures or even trigger them as a response to undesired 
events. 
 The research on risk assessment in SCADA systems has not yet reached a level of 
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maturity where a software tool automating a method would be thoroughly elaborated and 
presented at length alongside the method. Software tools may ease the evaluation of 
methods by academics and industry experts. The feedback from testing may assist with 
the refinement of methods and tools in many aspects including unambiguous intuitive 
user interface, which is of no small importance in risk assessment tools. The evaluation of 
a method on real more complex cases and on a larger number of cases is less tedious 
when the risk assessment process is at least partially automated. Open access and open 
source risk assessment tools for SCADA systems could expedite the progress of the 
domain remarkably. 
7. Conclusions 
 Over the years, we have seen a number of cyber attacks on CNI, ICS and SCADA 
systems (Section 2). The severity and consequences of attacks vary. Luckily, until now 
major disasters have mainly been averted. Unfortunately, without taking precautions we 
may not hope for this to happen in future as attackers get more sophisticated, experienced 
and malicious [93, Fig. 1]. 
 It may seem that the probability of catastrophic cyber attacks on SCADA systems 
is relatively low (Section 1). This may lead to a false sense of security if we overlook two 
points. 
 First, considering the number of attacks, it is worth remembering that only a small 
number of security incidents is reported -“Discussions with operators of traditional 
business crime reporting databases indicate that a typical incident database collects no 
better than one in ten of the actual events occurring” Error! Reference source not found.. 
Further, it is not possible to envision all possible attacks and the ways in which a SCADA 
system may fail. Resultantly, due to the inherent incompleteness of PRA methods, the 
actual value of the probability of cyber events occurrence is higher than estimated. For 
example, for incidents in power industry it was noted that “While these may not be 
frequent in an absolute sense, there are good reasons to believe that they will be far more 
frequent than quantitative tools such as probabilistic risk assessments 
predict” Error! Reference source not found.. In line with the above, it is stated 
in Error! Reference source not found. that “[c]omplex systems always retain the 
capacity to produce novel or surprising events.” 
 Second, a potential loss from a cyber attack may be so severe that the risk, which 
is calculated as a product of the loss from the attack and the probability of the attack, is 
estimated as substantial even with a very low attack occurrence probability. Substantial 
risk calls for proportionate security investments. 
 The imperative importance of ensuring the cyber security of CNI and SCADA 
systems specifically is recognised in the UK. In September 2014, 2.5 million investment 
was made by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the 
UK’s National Cyber Security Programme into a new research project focusing on the 
cyber-security of the UK’s CNI. The project is supported by the Centre for the Protection 
of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ). In April 2014, the Welsh Government and the EADS Foundation Wales 
invested in a new research project titled “SCADA Cyber Security Lifecycle”. The review 
paper at hand is one of the deliverables of this research project. 
 This paper contains a structured comprehensive overview of cyber security risk 
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assessment methods applied to SCADA systems. In this review, we followed a 
well-established literature search methodology and strived to made the literature review 
process transparent. 
 Overall, the contribution of this review paper is three-fold: 
 • A review of the state of art in risk assessment of SCADA systems, 
 • A new categorisation scheme for risk assessment methods, and 
 • An outline of the research challenges in the domain. 
 The review indicates that despite the fact that a large number of risk assessment 
methods for SCADA systems exists there is still room for further research and multiple 
improvements. Cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems may be 
improved in terms of (1) addressing the context establishment stage of the risk 
management process, (2) overcoming attack- or failure orientation, (3) accounting for the 
human factor, (4) the capturing and formalisation of expert opinion, (5) the improvement 
of the reliability of probabilistic data; (6) evaluation and validation, and (7) tool support. 
We also see a need for a comprehensive method which would cover all sages of the risk 
management process and deal with all key risk management concepts consistently. 
 In the paper, we also outlined some approaches that might be taken to these 
challenges. The consistent addressing of the specified research challenges will enhance 
future research about cyber security risk assessment methods in the SCADA context. We 
invite well positioned researchers and practitioners to extend the list of the challenges, 
and to continue the discussion. Shared understanding of the challenges facing the domain 
will facilitate its rapid maturing. 
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Figure 1: Generic SCADA hardware architecture. NIST SP 800-82 [1, p.2-7] 
Figure 2: Attack tree for a MODBUS-based SCADA system 
(excerpt) Error! Reference source not found. 
Figure 3: An attack step [68, 69] 
Figure 4: The number of papers per year 
Figure 5: Risk management process Error! Reference source not found. 
Table 1: List of the Risk Assessment Methods for SCADA Systems (ordered by the 
number of citations) 
No
. 
Ref. Yea
r 
Method Title Country Citation
s 
1 Error! Reference source not found. 201
1 
Risk 
Assessment, 
Detection, and 
Response 
USA 104 
2 Error! Reference source not found. 201
0 
Cybersecurity 
for Critical 
Infrastructures: 
Attack and 
Defense 
Modeling 
Ireland 87 
3 Error! Reference source not found. 200
4 
Attack Trees for 
Assessing 
Vulnerabilities 
Canada 85 
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in SCADA 
4 Error! Reference source not found. 200
6 
Quantitative 
Cyber Risk 
Reduction 
Estimation 
Methodology 
USA 44 
5 Error! Reference source not found. 200
8 
Two Indices 
Method for 
Quantitative 
Assessment of 
the Vulnerability 
of Critical 
Information 
Systems 
USA 31 
6 Error! Reference source not found. 200
4 
Risk Assessment 
in GPS-based 
SCADA for 
Railways 
USA 26 
7 Error! Reference source not found. 200
9 
Hierarchical, 
Model-Based 
Risk 
Management of 
Critical 
Infrastructures 
Italy 26 
8 Error! Reference source not found. 201
0 
Adversary-Drive
n State-Based 
System Security 
Evaluation 
USA 21 
9 Error! Reference source not found. 201
0 
Attack 
Countermeasure 
Tree 
USA 19 
10 Error! Reference source not found. 200
6 
Vulnerability 
Assessment of 
Cyber Security 
in Power 
Industry 
China 12 
11 Error! Reference source not found. 201
2 
Boolean logic 
Driven Markov 
Processes 
(BDMP) 
France 10 
12 Error! Reference source not found. 200
5 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Methodology for 
SCADA Securit 
USA 9 
13 Error! Reference source not found. 200
9 
Network 
Security Risk 
USA 8 
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Model (NSRM) 
14 Error! Reference source not found. 200
9 
Evaluating the 
Risk of Cyber 
Attacks on 
SCADA 
Systems via Petri 
Net Analysis 
USA 7 
15 Error! Reference source not found. 201
0 
Risk-Assessment 
Model for Cyber 
Attacks 
USA 7 
16 Error! Reference source not found. 201
2 
yber Security 
Risk Assessment 
in Nuclear 
Power Plants 
Korea 6 
17 Error! Reference source not found. 200
9 
Cyber-Terrorism 
SCADA Risk 
Framework 
Australi
a 
2 
18 Error! Reference source not found. 201
2 
CORAS-based 
Risk Assessment 
for SCADA 
USA 2 
19 Error! Reference source not found. 201
1 
Digraph Model 
for Risk 
Identification 
and Management 
in SCADA 
Systems 
USA 1 
20 Error! Reference source not found. 201
3 
”PMU-based 
Risk Assessment 
Framework for 
Power Control 
Systems 
USA 1 
21 Error! Reference source not found. 200
6 
Scenario-based 
Approach to 
Risk Analysis in 
Support of Cyber 
Security 
USA 0 
22 Error! Reference source not found. 201
4 
Improved Risk 
Assessment 
Method for 
SCADA 
Information 
Security 
Serbia 0 
23 Error! Reference source not found. 201
4 
”Cyber-Security 
Analysis of 
Smart Grid 
SCADA 
USA 0 
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Systems with 
Game Models 
24 Error! Reference source not found. 201
4 
Quantitative 
Methodology to 
Assess Cyber 
Security Risk of 
SCADA 
Systems 
Korea 0 
Table 2: Categorisation of the Methods by the Level of Detail and Coverage 
Level of detail 
Coverage 
High Low 
Broad Elaborated guidelines [18, 60, 63, 64, 72, 79] Guidelines [57, 61, 75] 
Narrow Activity-specific methods [5, 11, 23, 33, 59, 
31, 62, 67] [68, 71, 73, 76, 78, 80, 81] 
 
Table 3: Categorisation of the methods into qualitative and quantitative 
Category References 
Qualitative [23, 5, 61, 
75, 78] 
Quantitative Probabilistic [18, 33, 59, 
60, 31, 63, 
64, 67, 68, 
71, 72, 76, 
79, 80] 
Non-Probabilistic [62, 11, 81] 
Not specified [57] 
Table 4: Categorisation of the methods into formula-based and model-based 
Category References 
Formula-based [59, 60, 71, 73, 33, 81] 
Model-based Error! Reference source not found. - attack tree with characteristics of attack 
goals/nodes (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - directed graph of a system (G) 
Error! Reference source not found. - compromise graph (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - HHM (G) 
Error! Reference source not found. - vulnerability tree with threat-impact 
and cyber-vulnerability indices (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - Petri Net (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - hypergraph and evolution graph (D) 
Error! Reference source not found. - directed attack graph (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - attack tree with adversary profile (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - attack tree with countermeasures (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - attack graph with system-, scenario-, 
and leaf-level vulnerability indices (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - attack graph with probabilities of 
events (A) 
Error! Reference source not found. - game tree (game theory) (A)  
Error! Reference source not found. - fault tree with Markov processes with 
probabilities and success rates (A) 
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Error! Reference source not found. - CORAS modelling language (A) 
(A) - attack- or failure-oriented approach  
(G) - goal-oriented approach  
(D) - dual approach  
Table 5: Categorisation of the Methods by the Source of Probabilistic Data 
Source References 
None or not applicable [23, 57, 61, 62, 11, 75, 78] 
Applicable, but not 
specified 
[59, 67, 73, 73, 79] 
Historical data [63, 72, 33] 
Experts opinion [5, 18, 68, 71, 76] 
Experts opinion & historical 
data 
[60, 31, 64, 80, 81] 
Table 6: The overview of the Risk Assessment Methods 
Ref. Domain Aim Evaluation 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Rail road 
sector 
Identify sources 
of risk 
NO 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Energy 
sector 
Calculate the 
characteristics 
of the topmost 
attack event 
Initial settings are validated 
by energy sector operators; 
the feasibility of attacks is 
tested in a laboratory setting 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Energy 
sector 
Identifying 
vulnerabilities 
and assessing 
security of 
SCADA 
systems 
NO 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Small 
SCADA 
Calculate risk 
reduction in a 
security 
enhanced 
SCADA 
system 
Real life case study 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Energy 
sector 
Calculate cyber 
vulnerability 
index 
NO 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Nucle r 
plant 
Help decision 
makers with the 
allocation of 
financial and 
personnel 
resources to 
more critical 
attacks 
Generic case study 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Tank d 
pump 
Help system 
managers to 
Case study on a test SCADA 
system 
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system make informed 
decisions about 
security 
countermeasure
s 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! G neric 
SCADA 
Measure and 
protect SCADA 
systems from 
the threat of 
cyber-terrorism 
within 
Australia 
Focus group of five SCADA 
engineering consultants 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Hazardou
s liquid 
loading 
process 
Measure 
operational risk 
using 
non-probability
-based metrics 
Case study based on the 
system described 
in 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! G neric 
SCADA 
Automate 
definition of 
risk mitigation 
plan 
Generic example 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Crude oil 
pipeline 
pump 
station 
Assist with the 
selection of risk 
management 
controls 
Illustrative example on a 
simplified version of the 
system 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! G neric 
SCADA 
Ge ration of 
attack scenarios 
and selection of 
the optimal set 
of 
countermeasure
s 
Generic example of a 
SCADA attack analysed 
using SHARPE and 
MATLAB 
[68, 69] Electric 
power 
sector 
Simulate an 
attack on a 
system and 
calculate the 
probability of 
the success of 
the attack 
Examples from a generic 
electric power SCADA 
system, generic example 
from 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Chemical 
plant 
Calculate a 
total estimated 
revenue loss 
from all cyber 
attacks 
Real- world case study of a 
chemical engineering plant 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Energy 
sector 
Hypothetically 
evaluate the 
Application on a test subnet 
of electric power control 
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system 
vulnerability 
level in a 
simplified way 
network 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Chemical 
distillatio
n column 
Ass ss risk 
impact, 
diagnose faults 
and identify 
vulnerabilities 
Case study on a laboratory 
scale distillation column 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Chemical 
reactor 
system 
Identify high 
priority sensors 
for prioritising 
security budget 
Laboratory experiments 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Nucle r 
power 
plant 
Outline the risk 
assessment 
activities at the 
system design 
stage 
Example of a digital reactor 
protection system 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Stuxnet 
attack 
Attack 
modelling, and 
enumeration 
and 
quantification 
of the possible 
sequences of 
attack steps 
Model of the Stuxnet attack 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! G neric 
SCADA 
Risk modelling 
of a 
prototypical 
ICS using 
CORAS 
Case study 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Power 
grids 
Monitor the 
impact of cyber 
intrusions on 
power system 
dynamics in 
real time 
Simulation 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Hydro-po
wer plant 
Calculating 
how effective 
intrusion, 
detection and 
prevention 
systems are for 
preventing 
attacks 
Case study 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Smart Calculate Case study of a sensor 
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grid payoffs and 
find best action 
strategy for 
attacker and 
defender 
network SCADA 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! Smart 
grid 
Calculate 
expected 
damage from a 
cyber threat 
Case study 
Table 7: Stages of the Risk Management Process Addressed by the Methods 
Ref. Cont
ext 
Esta
blish
ment 
Risk 
Identi
ficatio
n 
Risk 
Analy
sis 
Risk 
Evaluat
ion 
Risk 
Treatm
ent 
Metrics analysed/measured 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      SCADA system submodels, element 
and subtopics, control objectives  
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attacker goals, resources required 
for an attack, severity of impact and 
detection probability 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Hardware, software and network 
vulnerabilities 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack scenarios, vulnerabilities and 
time-to-compromise 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Vulnerability index 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack variations, attacker skills, 
impact 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Vulnerability, threat-impact index 
and cyber-vulnerability index 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Terrorist cyber-capability level, 
terrorist motivation 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Process failure modes, failure 
consequences, attacker resources, 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Security dependency among the 
components of a system, attack 
strategies, the optimal set of 
countermeasures 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Infrastructure, failure modes and 
effects, processes, attack scenarios, 
network structure and access 
requirements 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack scenarios, cost and impact of 
an attack, optimal countermeasure 
set 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack graph, characteristics of 
adversary 
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DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack type, revenue loss 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Cybersecurity conditions, intrusion 
scenario,s vulnerability indices, port 
risk factor, password strength, 
security improvements 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Structure and behaviour of a system, 
fault propagation paths 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack model, linear model of the 
behaviour of a system, anomaly 
detection algorithm 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Security modelling, asset, impact, 
threat, vulnerability, security control 
design and penetration test 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack steps sequences 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Asset, vulnerability, and human and 
non-human threat modelling 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Attack graph 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Loss expectancy and return on 
investment 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Payoff, impact 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Asset value, threat, vulnerability, 
impact 
Table 8: Key Risk Management Concepts Addressed by the Methods 
Ref. System/
Asset 
Vuln
erabi
lity 
Threat/
Attack 
Countermea
sure 
Impact Impact Measurement 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     Level of severity on a 
relative scale 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     Monetary 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     Monetary and human 
lives 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Monetary 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     Number of injures 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Not specified 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Gallons of crude oil 
lost flow per day 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Monetary 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     Monetary 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Numeric index 
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DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      List of system 
components affected 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     N/A 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Voltage instability 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     Monetary 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!      Numeric index 
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!     Monetary 
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